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REDEFINING REVOLUTIONS
ANDREW ABERDEIN∗
1. A Nice Knockdown Argument
Moti Mizrahi does an admirable job in pruning the thicket that has grown up
around Thomas Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis. He begins with a distinction
between two versions of the thesis:
Taxonomic Incommensurability (TI) Periods of scientific change
(in particular, revolutionary change) that exhibit TI are sci-
entific developments in which existing concepts are replaced
with new concepts that are incompatible with the older con-
cepts. The new concepts are incompatible with the old con-
cepts in the following sense: two competing scientific theories
are conceptually incompatible (or incommensurable) just in
case they do not share the same “lexical taxonomy”. A lexi-
cal taxonomy contains the structures and vocabulary that are
used to state a theory.
Methodological Incommensurability (MI) There are no objective
criteria of theory evaluation. The familiar criteria of evalua-
tion, such as simplicity and fruitfulness, are not a fixed set of
rules. Rather, they vary with the currently dominant para-
digm. (Mizrahi 2015a, 362; references omitted).
Mizrahi’s focus is exclusively on (TI), a focus that I will share. He proceeds to
argue that, understood as (TI), the incommensurability thesis is poorly motivated.
His critique differs from that of many other authors in focussing on the weakness of
the arguments in support of (TI), rather than the strength of the arguments against
it. He claims that the former arguments must be either deductive or inductive. In
both cases, he presents a counterargument. Against deductive support, he argues
as follows:
(1) Reference change (discontinuity) is conclusive evidence for (TI) only if ref-
erence change (discontinuity) entails incompatibility of conceptual content.
(2) Reference change (discontinuity) does not entail incompatibility of concep-
tual content.
Therefore:
(3) It is not the case that reference change (discontinuity) is conclusive evidence
for (TI). (Mizrahi 2015a, 367).
Against inductive support, he argues as follows:
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(1) There is a strong inductive argument for (TI) only if there are no rebutting
defeaters against (TI).
(2) There are rebutting defeaters against (TI).
Therefore:
(3) It is not the case that there is a strong inductive argument for (TI). (Mizrahi
2015a, 371).
The merits of this critique have been addressed elsewhere (Kindi 2015; Marcum
2015; Patton 2015; Mizrahi 2015b,c). In this chapter, I will take a somewhat differ-
ent tack, by examining the implications for the philosophy of mathematical practice,
specifically the debate whether there can be mathematical revolutions. Hence I will
not engage closely with all the details of Mizrahi’s argument. However, I do wish
to draw attention to his use of ‘rebutting defeater’. Before introducing an exam-
ple from the history of medicine of a revolution in which conceptual continuity is
displayed, he stresses that
the following episode is not supposed to be a counterexample against
(TI). It is not meant to be a refutation of (TI). Rather, it shows
that an inductive argument based on a few selected historical
episodes of scientific change does not provide strong inductive sup-
port for (TI). Or, to put it another way, this episode—and oth-
ers like it—counts as what Pollock calls a rebutting defeater, i.e.
a prima facie reason to believe the negation of the original con-
clusion; in this case, the negation of (TI) (Mizrahi 2015a, 368;
reference omitted).
That is, cases of revolutionary change without conceptual discontinuity are rebut-
ting defeaters for (TI) since they are reasons to think that we can have one without
the other. They are not undercutting defeaters, since the familiar cases of revolu-
tionary change with conceptual discontinuity are still reasons to believe (TI), but
if we have as many reasons to disbelieve it as to believe it, we should probably
suspend our judgment.
2. There’s Glory for You!
Alice’s encounter with Humpty Dumpty is well-known to philosophers:
“I don’t know what you mean by ‘glory,’ ” Alice said.
Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. “Of course you don’t—
till I tell you. I meant ‘there’s a nice knock-down argument for
you!’ ”
“But ‘glory’ doesn’t mean ‘a nice knock-down argument,’ ” Alice
objected.
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful
tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor
less.”
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words
mean so many different things.”
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master—
that’s all.” (Carroll 1897, 106 f.).
Several echoes of this passage may be heard in this chapter, most clearly in a
Humpty-ish passage of my own:
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A glorious revolution occurs when the key components of a the-
ory are preserved, despite changes in their character and relative
significance. (We will refer to such preservation, constitutive of a
glorious revolution, as glory.) An inglorious revolution occurs when
some key component(s) are lost, and perhaps other novel material
is introduced by way of replacement. . . . A paraglorious revolution
occurs when all the key components are preserved, as in a glori-
ous revolution, but new key components are also added. . . . A
null revolution1 . . . when none of its key components change at all
(Aberdein and Read 2009, 618 f.).
Here is a slightly more formal characterization of this fourfold distinction. Let us
specify that the key components of a theory Tn comprise a structure of some sort,
Kn. Then succession between theories Tn and Tn+1 would be a null revolution
if their respective key components are unchanged, that is Kn = Kn+1, and a
glorious revolution if the key components are in some sense isomorphic, Kn ∼= Kn+1,
that is if there is a well-motivated bijection between them which respects their
roles in each theory. By contrast, in a paraglorious revolution there would be an
analogous isomorphic embedding of the key terms of the old theory within the new,
Kn →֒ Kn+1, such that the new theory contains terms with no clear counterpart
in the old. And, in what we may call a strict inglorious revolution, there would
be a similar isomorphic embedding of the key terms of the new theory within the
old, Kn ←֓ Kn+1, since there are components of the old theory which have been
irretrievably lost in the new. In other words, inglorious revolutions would exhibit
‘Kuhn loss’, a loss of (actual or potential) explanatory power (for further discussion,
see Votsis 2011, 111 ff.). (The more general sense of inglorious revolution may be
thought of as a strict inglorious revolution combined with a paraglorious revolution.
That is, there would be some structure K ′n, not necessarily corresponding to any
actually espoused theory, such that Kn ←֓ K ′n →֒ Kn+1.)
In my earlier presentation of this distinction, I addressed a number of questions,
the most important of which are what components are ‘key’ and how are they ‘pre-
served’? The simplest answer to the first question would be to make all components
of a theory key, or at least all components without which the theory could not be
articulated. A more subtle account would permit distinctions between the theory
proper and auxiliary theories, tentative extensions, and other inessential compo-
nents, but we need not explore that account here.2 Indeed, mathematical theories
are less trouble than empirical theories in this respect: they characteristically have
fewer components and their dependencies are much more clearly stated. The sec-
ond question is much more of a challenge. Indeed, it is central to understanding
what makes a revolution revolutionary: how much change is required for a revolu-
tion? Conversely, how much change can a theory undergo without revolution? In
other words, just what do we mean by ‘glory’? An obvious starting point would be
taxonomic commensurability, that is the absence of TI. Notice, incidentally, that
lexical taxonomy is shared across neither inglorious nor paraglorious revolutions.
1Less happily, I also referred to theories in null revolution as being in stasis, but ‘stasis’ is a
false friend: although it has come to mean an absence of change, for Aristotle it meant something
much like revolution, and is often translated as such (Howell 1985, 18).
2The sort of distinction I have in mind is that Stathis Psillos draws between idle and essentially
contributing constituents (Psillos 1996, S311) or Philip Kitcher between presuppositional and
working posits (Kitcher 1993, 149).
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I have defined inglorious and paraglorious revolutions such that the distinction is
essentially a matter of historic sequence: whether such a transition counts as inglo-
rious or paraglorious will depend on which theory came first. The definition of (TI),
however, despite references to ‘new’ and ‘old’, does not seem to directly appeal to
chronology.
Another question posed by this framework concerns the transitivity (or not) of
these different characterizations of change. A succession of null revolutions must
be a null revolution, because we have stipulated strict identity between key com-
ponents. But a succession of glorious revolutions need not be a glorious revolution:
a series of comparatively small changes might add up to a big change, as in a
sorites sequence of small changes of colour from red to blue. Likewise, the preser-
vation aspect of paraglorious revolution may fail over a long enough sequence of
such revolutions, making the sequence as a whole inglorious. Inglorious revolutions
themselves are more straightforward: in principle, two consecutive inglorious revo-
lutions might cancel each other out, so inglorious revolution must be intransitive.
A final concern leads us back to Humpty Dumpty: mere survival (or not) of
vocabulary is not what is at issue.3 Conceptual change might be disguised by
a shift in the meaning of a shared vocabulary; conversely, a drastic change of
vocabulary may give a misleading impression of change when nothing substantive
has occurred. This issue is familiar from political examples: Augustus strategically
reused much of the terminology of the old Roman Republic; Stalin was careful
not to call himself a Tsar. In our context, this suggests that there are not four,
but sixteen relationships between the key components of succeeding theories (using
subscripts to indicate outward appearances):
Kn == Kn+1 Kn ∼== Kn+1 Kn →֒= Kn+1 Kn ←֓= Kn+1
Kn =∼= Kn+1 Kn ∼=∼= Kn+1 Kn →֒∼= Kn+1 Kn ←֓∼= Kn+1
Kn =→֒ Kn+1 Kn ∼=→֒ Kn+1 Kn →֒→֒ Kn+1 Kn ←֓ →֒ Kn+1
Kn =←֓ Kn+1 Kn ∼=←֓ Kn+1 Kn →֒←֓ Kn+1 Kn ←֓←֓ Kn+1
The salutary point here is that we need to be careful in how we specify our terms,
lest we misclassify (apparent) revolutions. In particular, the sharing of ‘lexical
taxonomy’ had better be more than just lexical, or the innocuous null revolution at
the bottom left could count as a case of TI while the stealthy inglorious revolution
at the top right does not.
A bold sceptical thesis would be that the rightmost two columns are in practice
uninstantiated; that is, all revolutions are glorious, and all appearances to the
contrary deceptive. As we will see in the next section, just such a view has been
proposed by some historians of mathematics.
3. Mathematical Revolutions?
The discussion of mathematical revolutions essentially begins with Michael Crowe,
who boldly asserts as a ‘law’ that ‘Revolutions never occur in mathematics’ (Crowe
1975, 19). Nonetheless, his own subsequent writings are increasingly nuanced: he
has moved from denying that there any revolutions in mathematics to suggesting
that even inglorious revolutions may be possible (1988, 264 f.; 1992, 313). Joseph
Dauben has published several articles arguing for the existence of mathematical
revolutions (Dauben 1984, 1992, 1996). However, as we shall see, his position is
3Mizrahi also addresses this issue (Mizrahi 2015a, 374).
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much closer to Crowe’s than might be expected. Indeed, as one commentator,
writing more than twenty years ago, has remarked, the literature on mathematical
revolutions represents an ‘authentic theoretical shambles’ (Otero 1996, 193). There
have been two collections of papers on the topic (Gillies 1992; Ausejo and Hormigón
1996). But the editor of the first notes that each of his authors ‘has a different the-
oretical perspective’ (Gillies 1992, 8). And a contributor to the second pointedly
observes that none of these authors make much use of a Kuhnian framework in
their other writing on mathematical practice (Corry 1996, 170). In this section I
shall attempt to resolve some of this confusion.4
Many accounts of revolutions in mathematics distinguish two sorts of revolution,
usually in terms of the presence or absence of some sort of conceptual continuity.
Hence Crowe distinguishes a ‘transformational event’, in which ‘an accepted theory
is overthrown by another theory, which may be old or new’, from a ‘formational
event’, in which ‘an area of science is not transformed, but is formed. The dis-
covery that produces this effect is usually new, and by definition overthrows and
replaces nothing’ (Crowe 1992, 310, citing his own earlier work). Dauben likens
mathematical revolutions to the Glorious Revolution of 1688, in the persistence of
the ‘old order’, albeit ‘under different terms, in radically altered or expanded con-
texts’ (Dauben 1984, 52). This political analogy is echoed by Donald Gillies, who
frames the distinction as between ‘Franco-British’ and ‘Russian’ revolutions: in the
former a ‘previously existing entity persists’ through ‘a considerable loss of impor-
tance’; in the latter the ‘previously existing entity’ is ‘overthrown and irrevocably
discarded’ (Gillies 1992, 5). Gillies’s choice of terminology provokes the distracting
historiographical question of why the French revolution should be more like the
British than the Russian. After all, France and Russia both ended up as republics,
whereas Britain did not. The answer seems to be that Gillies stops the clock at
some point in the reign of Louis-Philippe. My own use of ‘glorious’ revolutions,
inspired by Dauben’s usage but not intended to be given any specific historical
reading, at least has the merit of sidestepping such musings. More importantly, we
may notice that these distinctions do not necessarily coincide—Crowe’s formational
events seem closer to paraglorious than glorious revolutions, for example—and that,
although all of them are binary, none of them seems to be exhaustive. So a more
fine-grained distinction may be a source of clarity.
However the distinction is drawn, most of its framers agree that only glorious
revolutions are possible in mathematics: ‘One important consequence, in fact, of the
insistence on self-consistency within mathematics is that its advance is necessarily
cumulative. New theories cannot displace the old’ (Dauben 1984, 62); ‘In science
both Russian and Franco-British revolutions occur. In mathematics, revolutions do
occur but they are always of Franco-British type’ (Gillies 1992, 6); ‘revolutions do
occur in mathematics, but are confined entirely to the metamathematical compo-
nent of the community’s shared background’ (Dunmore 1992, 223). In this regard
they concur with the opinion of many mathematicians that their discipline is cumu-
lative. Crowe finds such sentiments expressed by Fourier in 1822, Hankel in 1869,
and Truesdell in 1968 (Crowe 1975, 19). Indeed, celebrated mathematicians are still
saying as much: ‘central contributions have been lasting, one does not supersede
another, it enlarges it’ (Langlands 2013, 25). As Crowe poetically summarizes the
4For a more extensive account of the debate over revolutions in mathematics, see
(François and Van Bendegem 2010, 107 ff.).
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conventional view, ‘Scattered over the landscape of the past of mathematics are
numerous citadels, once proudly erected, but which, although never attacked, are
now left unoccupied by active mathematicians’ (Crowe 1988, 263). Nonetheless,
there are exceptions to this trend. Michael Harris notes Kronecker in 1891 observ-
ing that ‘in this respect mathematics is no different from the natural sciences: new
phenomena overturn the old hypotheses and put others in their place’ and Siegel
in 1964 characterizing work revisionary of his own as ‘a pig broken into a beautiful
garden and rooting up all flowers and trees’ (Harris 2015, 4).
Bruce Pourciau complains that the ‘Crowe–Dauben debate’ is actually a ‘Crowe–
Dauben consensus’, viz.: Kuhnian revolutions are inherently impossible in mathe-
matics’ (Pourciau 2000, 301). For Pourciau a revolution is Kuhnian or ‘noncumu-
lative whenever some true statements of the old conception have no translations
(faithful to the original meaning) which are true statements in the new conception’
(Pourciau 2000, 301). Pourciau argues that Brouwerian intuitionism is a (failed)
Kuhnian revolution. Certainly, if adopted, this would have required wholesale re-
vision of results treated as certain by prior mathematicians, thereby meeting the
strictest definition of Kuhnian revolution. Its usefulness as an example might be
somewhat compromised by the fact that it never actually happened, but it was
seriously proposed and still commands some support. However, Pourciau may be
overestimating the difficulty in supplying examples of Kuhnian revolutions in math-
ematics in two ways: one of scale, one of chronology. Firstly, although the standard
example of a Kuhnian revolution in natural science is the Copernican revolution,
an epochal upending of an all-encompassing worldview, it is a mistake to suppose
that all Kuhnian revolutions need be so drastic. Stephen Toulmin once complained
that Kuhn had surreptitiously revised his position to admit ‘small-scale “micro-
revolutions”’ (Toulmin 1970, 47). Kuhn strenuously rejected this imputation: ‘My
concern . . . has been throughout what Toulmin now takes it to have become: a
little studied type of conceptual change which occurs frequently in science and
is fundamental to its advance’ (Kuhn 1970, 249 f.). He subsequently character-
ized a paradigm as ‘what the members of a scientific community and they alone
share’ where such communities may comprise ‘perhaps 100 members, sometimes
significantly fewer’ (Kuhn 1974, 460; 462). Happily enough, this coincides with an
influential estimate of the size of mathematical research communities: ‘a few dozen
(at most a few hundred)’ (Davis and Hersh 1980, 35). Secondly, as observed above,
paraglorious and inglorious revolutions are essentially symmetrical; they differ only
in the chronological sequence of the contrasting theories. Paraglorious revolutions
are cumulative, but they exhibit a conceptual discontinuity formally identical to
that exhibited by inglorious revolutions. Chronological sequence alone does not
seem to be a principled basis on which to discount paraglorious revolutions as Kuh-
nian.5
Three broad strategies for the identification of Kuhnian (or nonglorious) revolu-
tions in mathematics arise from this discussion. Firstly, we may look directly for
inglorious revolutions: conceptual shifts within mathematics in which key compo-
nents have been lost. Secondly, we may look for paraglorious revolutions: concep-
tual shifts within mathematics in which key components have been gained. Thirdly,
5I make no claim as to Kuhn’s own view on this issue, although I note that he does refer to
historians experiencing revolutions by ‘moving through time in a direction opposite to scientists’
(Kuhn 2000 [1983], 57), which at least suggests an openness to temporal symmetry.
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we may look for sorites-like sequences of glorious (or paraglorious) revolutions which
exhibit non-transitivity of glory, that is which are collectively inglorious. The search
is complicated by several factors. In particular, it is not easy to determine whether
a given episode is revolutionary; nor is it easy to determine what type of revolution
a given revolutionary episode exemplifies. Hence some of the same examples might
be claimed as successes for more than one of these search strategies. An analysis
of even a single case study thorough enough to settle all of these issues would be
beyond the scope of this chapter. However, in the following sections I will discuss
several putative mathematical revolutions in what I hope to be at least enough
detail to indicate the prospects for these strategies.
4. Q→ R→ C
The most obvious example of incommensurability in mathematics must be in-
commensurability itself! The concept is, of course, originally a mathematical one,
credited to the very earliest Greek geometers, the Pythagoreans. Thomas Heath,
in his edition of Euclid, quotes a scholium on the first proposition of Book X, at-
tributed to Proclus: ‘They called all magnitudes measurable by the same measure
commensurable, but those which are not subject to the same measure incommensu-
rable’ (Heath 2006 [1908], 684). Specifically, the Pythagoreans discovered that
√
2
was incommensurable with the natural numbers, that is, it cannot be expressed as
a ratio of natural numbers or, as we would say, as a rational number. The discovery
was credited to one Hippasus of Metapontum, who is reputed to have drowned in
a shipwreck. As the historian of mathematics Kurt von Fritz observes,
The discovery of incommensurability must have made an enormous
impression in Pythagorean circles because it destroyed with one
stroke the belief that everything could be expressed in integers,
on which the whole Pythagorean philosophy up to then had been
based. This impression is clearly reflected in those legends which
say that Hippasus was punished by the gods for having made public
his terrible discovery (Fritz 1945, 260).
Even in ancient times, the allegorical aspects of this story were already apparent,
‘hinting that everything irrational and formless is properly concealed, and, if any
soul should rashly invade this region of life and lay it open, it would be carried
away into the sea of becoming and be overwhelmed by its unresting currents’, as
Proclus puts it (Heath 2006 [1908], 684).
For our purposes, the crucial point in this narrative is that the change initiated
by Hippasus was revisionary of earlier mathematics: it ‘required an entirely new
concept of ratio and proportion and a new criterion to determine whether two pairs
of magnitudes which are incommensurable with one another have the same [ratio]’
(Fritz 1945, 262). The completion of this task by later mathematicians, notably
Theaetetus and Eudoxus, is one of the great achievements of Greek mathematics,
and plausibly a major driver of its early development of the concept of rigorous
proof. For Dauben it is one of the best examples of a mathematical revolution. He
stresses that the ‘transformation of the concept of number . . . entailed more than
just extending the old concept of number by adding on the irrationals—the entire
concept of number was inherently changed, transmuted as it were, from a world-
view in which integers alone were numbers, to a view of number that was eventually
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related to the completeness of the entire system of real numbers’ (Dauben 1984,
57).
In my terminology, this is clearly not a glorious revolution, since a literally
incommensurable concept has been added. So it is at least a paraglorious revolution.
Might we go further and identify it as also inglorious? On the one hand something
has certainly been lost: the ‘world-view in which integers alone were numbers’,
for a start. On the other hand, world-views are not part of the subject matter of
mathematics. Hence Caroline Dunmore identifies this shift as ‘the first great meta-
level revolution in the development of mathematics’ (Dunmore 1992, 215). On
Dunmore’s account, object level revolutions in mathematics are always glorious,
but they are always accompanied by inglorious revolutions in the meta-level, that
is in the philosophical or methodological presuppositions (Dunmore 1992, 225). The
rational numbers are still an object of mathematical enquiry and the Pythagorean
results about their comparison still hold. Nonetheless, it is highly misleading to
conceive of the real numbers as a conservative extension of the rationals. The real
numbers are constructed on a quite different basis, but in such a way that a subset
isomorphic to the rationals may be identified.
Strictly speaking, the taxonomic incommensurability between mathematics de-
fined over Q and mathematics defined over R runs both ways. Clearly, real math-
ematics cannot be done with rationals alone, but techniques that work over Q
fail over R. So a revolution from the mathematics of Q to the mathematics of R
would be paraglorious and inglorious. However, the actual revolution could also
be described as a shift from the mathematics of Q to (eventually) the mathemat-
ics of Q and R, understood as separate projects. That shift would be strictly
paraglorious—assuming that the mathematics of Q has been preserved, and not
just reconstructed. The same issue arises with supersets of the reals, whether
well-established, such as the complex numbers, or more contentious, such as the
hyperreals, which include infinitesimals (Bair et al. 2013). The underlying issue of
cross-sortal identity is a known problem for a wide range range of philosophies of
mathematics (Cook and Ebert 2005, 124). Textbook presentations of the founda-
tions of mathematics are obliged to address cross-sortal identity, which they do in a
variety of ways, often at odds with mathematical practice (for a careful discussion,
see Ganesalingam 2013, 180 ff.). It is also important to note that retrofitting a new
foundation onto existing mathematics is not confined to number systems. Indeed it
has been a major feature of mathematical research since the nineteenth century—
and it is precisely what Siegel was complaining about as ‘rooting up all flowers and
trees’ (Lang 1994). It is a deep question whether such moves can be understood as
merely adding ‘a new storey to the old structure’ (Crowe 1975, 19, quoting Han-
kel). To pursue the architectural metaphor, they might be better characterized as
‘façading’, whereby the front elevation of an otherwise demolished building is incor-
porated into its successor. I shan’t settle that question here, but we may observe
that these shifts are at least paraglorious and perhaps inglorious.
5. Irony for Mathematicians
One way of approaching the issue of inglorious revolution in mathematics is
through a related question: when do mathematicians say things that are not so?
One prospect might be the assumptions of reductio proofs. In a recent essay,
the mathematician Timothy Gowers briefly considers, but ultimately rejects, the
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intriguing idea ‘that proofs by contradiction are the mathematician’s version of
irony’ (Gowers 2012, 224). He objects that ‘when we give a proof by contradiction,
we make it very clear that we are discussing a counterfactual, so our words are
intended to be taken at face value’ (op. cit.). Perhaps more tellingly, we might
frame this objection as saying that a proposition assumed for the purposes of proof
by contradiction is presented as the antecedent of a conditional: ‘If P were the
case, then . . . a contradiction would follow. So, not P .’ Nonetheless, at least for
the duration of the ellipsis, the mathematician proceeds as though P were being
seriously entertained. An inattentive reader who began reading a proof part way
through would not necessarily be able to tell which proposition the mathematician
intended to show to be false—or even that any of them were presented with this
intent.
Another possibility might be unproven conjectures upon which mathematicians
sometimes rely, when exploring their consequences. The mathematician Barry
Mazur talks of ‘architectural conjectures’ that ‘play the role of “joists” and “sup-
porting beams” for some larger mathematical structure yet to be made’ (Mazur
1997, 199). The formulation of such conjectures
is often a way of “formally” packaging, or at least acknowledg-
ing, an otherwise shapeless body of mathematical experience that
points to their truth. . . . These conjectures sometimes round out
a field by being clear, general (but not yet proved) statements
enabling one to understand where a certain amount of on-going,
perhaps fragmentary, specialized work is headed; they provide a
focus (op. cit.).
Architectural conjectures seldom arise alone; they often comprise elaborate net-
works of interlinked conjectures that present the outline of what is hoped to be
many years of fruitful work. One of the best known such networks of conjectures
in contemporary mathematics is the Langlands programme, ‘an extensive web of
conjectures by which number theory, algebra, and analysis are interrelated in a pre-
cise manner, eliminating the official divisions between the subdisciplines’ (Zalamea
2012, 180). This has been enormously influential, guiding the work of scores of
mathematicians who have confirmed some—but by no means all—of its key con-
jectures.
As with reductio hypotheses, conjectures are strictly to be understood as the
antecedents of conditionals. Mathematicians should not be seen as asserting them
until they have actually been proven. Nonetheless, as with reductio hypotheses,
they are presented in apparent earnest, and their implications investigated with
all due rigour: they ‘are expected to turn out to be true, as, of course, are all
conjectures’ (Mazur 1997, 199). So, naively, it may seem as though neither sort of
hypothesis is much use for present purposes, since mathematicians seem to have
an uncanny knack of only assuming for proof by contradiction things that are false
and only assuming as conjectures things that are true (even if not yet proven).
This would be a profound misperception: attempted reductios sometimes founder
on the truth of the hypothesis (famously so in the accidental discovery of non-
Euclidean geometry) and sometimes substantial effort is devoted to exploring the
consequences of false conjectures. In the next section we will encounter an example
of the latter.
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6. The World Without End Hypothesis
In 2016 Michael Hill, Michael Hopkins, and Douglas Ravenel published an ar-
ticle in one of the most prestigious journals in mathematics, with the following
abstract: ‘We show that the Kervaire invariant one elements θj ∈ π2j+1−2S0 exist
only for j ≤ 6. By Browder’s Theorem, this means that smooth framed manifolds
of Kervaire invariant one exist only in dimensions 2, 6, 14, 30, 62, and possibly 126.
Except for dimension 126 this resolves a longstanding problem in algebraic topol-
ogy’ (Hill et al. 2016, 1). This was the final, fully vetted version of a result that
they had announced seven years earlier. As they summarize their result in a prelim-
inary expository article, they showed that ‘certain long sought hypothetical maps
[the θj for j ≥ 7] between high dimensional spheres do not exist’ (Hill et al. 2010,
32). This outcome was a surprising one, not just because of the technical depth
of the work required but because many experts in the area had long expected the
opposite result: ‘The problem solved by our theorem is nearly 50 years old. There
were several unsuccessful attempts to solve it in the 1970s. They were all aimed at
proving the opposite of what we have proved’ (Hill et al. 2010, 32). The hypoth-
esis that the sought after maps all exist came to be known as the World Without
End Hypothesis; the contradictory hypothesis that the θj only exist for small j
was known as the Doomsday Hypothesis. Hill, Hopkins, and Ravenel proved the
Doomsday Hypothesis, and thereby disproved the World Without End Hypothesis.
While not remotely on the scale of the Langlands Programme, the World Without
End Hypothesis was not just a single assertion, but the basis for a whole system of
‘architectural conjectures’: the new proof demolished ‘what Ravenel calls an entire
“cosmology” of conjectures’ (Klarreich 2011, 374). The triumph of the Dooms-
day Hypothesis undercut a growing sense of understanding provided by the World
Without End Hypothesis. As the reviewer of Hill, Hopkins, and Ravenel’s paper
in Mathematical Reviews comments, the World Without End Hypothesis ‘was so
compelling that many believed the θj must exist; now that we know they don’t, the
behavior of the EHP sequence is much more mysterious. In particular, Mahowald’s
ηj-elements . . . now appear entirely anomalous’ (Goerss 2016). The author of a
book surveying some of the techniques developed in pursuit of the World Without
End Hypothesis published shortly before Hill, Hopkins, and Ravenel’s announce-
ment concluded his preface as follows: ‘In the light of the above conjecture [the
Doomsday Hypothesis] and the failure over fifty years to construct framed mani-
folds of Arf-Kervaire invariant one this might turn out to be a book about things
which do not exist’ (Snaith 2009, ix).
The collapse of the World Without End Hypothesis seems to be an inglorious
revolution. It is clearly a case of referential discontinuity, since a whole class of
objects which were key to the old theory have been shown not to exist. It might be
objected that there is no taxonomic incommensurability, since the conjectures are
still perfectly intelligible, despite now being known to be false. Indeed we have seen
that Mizrahi argues that referential discontinuity does not entail conceptual in-
compatibility, and is thereby insufficient for taxonomic incommensurability (see §1
above). So what else is required? A natural candidate would be Kuhn loss: reduc-
tion in actual or potential explanatory power. Kuhn loss does not seem to feature
in the examples Mizrahi adduces of referential discontinuity without conceptual in-
compatibility (Mizrahi 2015a, 365 ff.), but it is exhibited here: the understanding
that had seemed to follow from the World Without End Hypothesis has been lost.
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Specifically, comments such as Paul Goerss’s reveal the ‘mysterious’ and ‘anoma-
lous’ nature of some of the surviving results, now that the architectural conjectures
which mathematicians had relied on to understand them have been falsified. This
is what we should expect from a reduction in explanatory power.
If the collapse of the World Without End Hypothesis is a revolution, it is certainly
a small-scale one. The constituency of homotopy theorists for whom this was an
active research area would be at the low end of Kuhn’s ‘perhaps 100 members,
sometimes significantly fewer’ comprising a scientific community (Kuhn 1974, 462).
However, this makes this revolution much more likely to be typical of mathematical
revolutions. Large-scale revolutions are necessarily extremely rare; so much so that
their instances may well be sui generis. Conversely, small-scale revolutions are
much better placed to support generalizations: there are plenty of other failed
architectural conjectures that could be explored in similar detail (see, for example,
some of the ‘cautionary tales’ in Jaffe and Quinn 1993, 7 f.).
7. Inter-Universal Teichmüller Theory
One of the more widely discussed open problems in modern number theory is
the abc conjecture. Like many such problems it can be stated quite simply, but
defies simple solution. Here is what it says:
The abc conjecture. For every ε > 0, there are only finitely many triples (a, b, c)
of coprime positive integers where a + b = c, such that c > d1+ε, where d denotes
the radical of abc (the product of its distinct prime factors).
For example, try a = 15 and b = 28. These are coprime, but c = 43 and
d = 2 × 3 × 5 × 7 × 43 = 9030 ≫ 43. So (15, 28, 43) is not one of the specified
triples (for any ε). On the other hand, let a = 1 and b = 63. Then we have c = 64
and d = 2 × 3 × 7 = 42 < 64. So (1, 63, 64) is such a triple (at least for values of
ε < .11269).
In a series of preprints appearing on his website in 2012, the respected mathe-
matician Shinichi Mochizuki claimed to have a proof of the abc conjecture. However,
Mochizuki’s claimed proof introduced so many new techniques and concepts that
other leading mathematicians in the field described it as like ‘reading a paper from
the future, or from outer space’ and as ‘very, very weird’ (cited in Chen 2013).
The scale of the proof (more than 500 pages) and its sheer incomprehensibility,
even by the standards of cutting-edge research mathematics, have so far stalled all
attempts at the normal processes of confirmation and acceptance that transform
a proof claim into an established proof. Although a handful of other mathemati-
cians now profess to understand Mochizuki’s work, they have had little success
sharing that understanding more widely. One anonymous mathematician, quoted
in Nature, summed up the problem:
“Everybody who I’m aware of who’s come close to this stuff is quite
reasonable, but afterwards they become incapable of communicat-
ing it”. . . The situation, he says, reminds him of the Monty Python
skit about a writer who jots down the world’s funniest joke. Any-
one who reads it dies from laughing and can never relate it to
anyone else (Castelvecchi 2015, 181).
Mochizuki calls his work inter-universal Teichmüller theory, or IUTeich. He has
reflected on the verification process of IUTeich in a pair of papers that comprise
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a valuable resource for philosophers of mathematical practice (Mochizuki 2013,
2014).6 Mochizuki warns that ‘any attempt to study IUTeich under the expec-
tation that the essential thrust of IUTeich will proceed via a similar pattern of
argument to existing mathematical theories is likely to end in failure’ (Mochizuki
2013, 5; all emphases Mochizuki’s). Even Teichmüller theory itself is only an in-
direct inspiration. Nonetheless, IUTeich does echo Teichmüller theory in at least
one respect—the papers in which Oswald Teichmüller laid out his theory were not
immediately accepted by the mathematical community either: ‘It was after sev-
eral years of hard work by several mathematicians that all the arguments in these
papers were considered as being sound’ (Ji and Papadopoulos 2013, 128). So a
lengthy gap before final community acceptance is not unusual in itself. (Note also
the seven years between initial announcement and final publication of Hill, Hopkins,
and Ravenel’s work.) What is unusual in Mochizuki’s case is that the mathematical
community appears to be completely stumped.
The trouble arises from both the scale and the nature of the task required of
mathematicians who wish to come to terms with Mochizuki’s work. He suggests,
perhaps optimistically, that ‘it is quite possible to achieve a reasonably rigorous un-
derstanding of the theory within a period of a little less than half a year ’ (Mochizuki
2013, 4). But this is still a substantial investment of time. Mochizuki also notes
that his work is essentially independent of the Langlands Programme (discussed
in §5) (Mochizuki 2014, 10). Since this has guided so much recent work in num-
ber theory, many of the individuals most interested in the abc conjecture have a
background that does not particularly suit them for tackling IUTeich, and should
not necessarily expect to acquire techniques that would further their own projects
from the six months or more of concentrated intellectual effort required. Indeed,
Mochizuki stresses the incompatibility of the ideas behind IUTeich and the ideas
most number theorists are familiar with: ‘the most essential stumbling block lies
not so much in the need for the acquisition of new knowledge, but rather in the
need for researchers . . . to deactivate the thought patterns that they have installed
in their brains and taken for granted for so many years and then to start afresh’
(Mochizuki 2014, 11 f.). He complains that
when a researcher with a solid track record in mathematical re-
search decides to read a mathematical paper, . . . such a researcher
will attempt to digest the content of the paper in as efficient a
way as is possible, by scanning the paper for important terms and
theorems so that the researcher may apply his/her vast store of
expertise and deep understanding of the subject to determine just
which of those topics of the subject that, from point of view of the
researcher, have already been “digested” and “well understood”
play a key role in the paper. . . . Of course, in the case of IUTeich,
a researcher who already possesses a deep understanding, as well
as a solid track record in mathematical research, concerning such
topics as absolute anabelian geometry, the rigidity properties of
the étale theta function, and Hodge-Arakelov theory, may indeed
find such “occasional nibbling” to be more than sufficient to attain
a quite genuine understanding of IUTeich. In fact, however, for
6For a very different application of these papers to the philosophy of mathematical practice,
see (Tanswell 2016, 187 ff.).
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better or worse, no such researcher exists (other than myself) at
the present time (Mochizuki 2014, 8 f.).
This is an eloquent description of conceptual incompatibility. Mochizuki is not
just saying that no one is capable of understanding IUTeich; on the contrary, he is
confident that the material is well within the grasp of competent research math-
ematicians. But he stresses that, if they are to understand IUTeich, they must
sat aside their existing conceptual frameworks and build a new one from scratch.
The contrast which Mochizuki draws echoes that Kuhn draws between translation
as opposed to interpretation and language acquisition; incommensurability being a
bar to the former, but not the latter (Kuhn 2000 [1983], 53).
If the revolution which Mochizuki has so far failed to ignite succeeds, it would
appear to be strictly paraglorious in nature. He does not wish to overturn any-
thing; rather he wishes to comprehensively supplement the existing apparatus of
number theory. If IUTeich is correct, it will represent a substantial leap forward
in mathematics. Mochizuki’s problem is that he’s trying to do it all in one go.
Conversely, if an irreparable flaw is found in Mochizuki’s reasoning, and IUTeich
collapses, then its fall would be an inglorious revolution. In either case, IUTeich
would exhibit similar conceptual incompatibility with mainstream number theory.
8. Classical → Modern → Contemporary
mathematics
elementary
advanced (=‘real’)
classical
modern
contemporary
Figure 1. Correlations between the areas of mathematics: el-
ementary, advanced, classical, modern, contemporary (after
Zalamea 2012, 26; used with permission)
As a final example, I wish to shift focus from some ultimately quite small-scale
revolutions (albeit ones that have attracted a fair bit of publicity) to the discipline of
mathematics as a whole. The mathematician Fernando Zalamea offers the following
useful periodization of research in his discipline:
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Classical mathematics (midseventeenth to midnineteenth centuries): sophisticated
use of the infinite (Pascal, Leibniz, Euler, Gauss);
Modern mathematics (midnineteenth to midtwentieth centuries): sophisticated
use of structural and qualitative properties (Galois, Riemann, Hilbert);
Contemporary mathematics (midtwentieth century to present): sophisticated use
of the properties of transference, reflection and gluing (Grothendieck, Serre,
Shelah). (Zalamea 2012, 27)
The scale of mathematical research grows with each generation, such that each
period attacks a broader front and produces more results than its predecessors.
Zalamea graphically represents this process in the diagram reproduced as Fig. 1.
The moral for the philosopher of mathematical practice is a striking one: classical
and modern mathematics may be familiar enough from school or undergraduate
study, but contemporary mathematics almost certainly is not. Even philosophers
who take pains to reflect more than just elementary and foundational work may
well be quite out of touch with the conceptual underpinnings of mathematical
research conducted in their own lifetimes. Hence, as Zalamea complains, the large
scale conceptual shift from modern to contemporary mathematics has gone largely
unremarked by philosophers. I would contend that this shift may be understood
as revolutionary. Certainly the ‘properties of transference, reflection and gluing’
would be impossible to articulate with only the conceptual resources available to
Galois, Riemann, or Hilbert (let alone Pascal, Leibniz, Euler, or Gauss). Insofar
as these are key components of contemporary mathematics, their acquisition is
at least paraglorious. Furthermore, contemporary mathematics has undergone a
sorites-like sequence of paraglorious revolutions of such daunting scope that the
key components preserved throughout the sequence have a drastically diminished
role in the new era. So much so indeed, that the whole transition might best be
characterized as inglorious.
9. Conclusion
To take stock, we have seen four case studies exemplifying different classes of
putative revolution in mathematics: the shift from rational to real numbers (and
other cases of foundational retrofitting); shifts occasioned by the collapse of an ar-
chitectural conjecture, such as the World Without End Hypothesis; shifts resulting
from a rapid advance, such as IUTeich; and the collective large-scale shift that has
transformed recent mathematics. The first of these is at least paraglorious and per-
haps also inglorious. The second seems to be strictly inglorious whereas the third
is strictly paraglorious (if successful; if unsuccessful, it would be another failed ar-
chitectural conjecture). Both of these examples are comparatively small-scale and
might be seen as exemplary of similar shifts in other areas of mathematics. Lastly,
the shift from modern to contemporary mathematics has involved numerous con-
ceptual innovations, each of which might be seen as paraglorious, and, when taken
collectively, might represent a sorites-like inglorious revolution.
So where do Mizrahi and I agree and disagree? He disputes whether there are
revolutions exhibiting (TI) in science; I have argued that such revolutions can
be found in mathematics. I take it that we both agree with Crowe that it is
a misconception that ‘the methodology of mathematics is radically different from
that of science’ (Crowe 1988, 271). So we should both like for the story we tell about
revolutions to hold for both science and mathematics. Of course, you don’t always
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get what you want—conventional wisdom might suggest that we are both wrong
across the board: science and mathematics are methodologically discontinuous in
part because science exhibits (inglorious) revolutions but mathematics does not.
Conversely, someone might defend the contrarian stance that Mizrahi and I are both
right about revolutions but wrong about the methodological continuity of science
and mathematics, because (inglorious) revolutions are confined to mathematics.
(This is not as absurd as it may appear—some of the strategies for minimizing
the revolutionary aspects of conceptual shifts in science, such as finding common
referents between theories, may not work in a field where all the referents are
abstract objects.) However, I believe a more satisfactory resolution is possible.
To see how this might be accomplished, it will help to recast Mizrahi’s arguments
in my terminology. (TI) may be understood as saying that no revolutions are
glorious. So a rebutting defeater against (TI) would be a glorious revolution. Since
there are glorious revolutions, Mizrahi concludes that (TI) lacks strong inductive
support. However, if we restrict (TI) to inglorious and paraglorious revolutions,
then glorious revolutions no longer count as rebutting defeaters. Mizrahi does
consider, and reject, a related proposal from the ‘friends of (TI)’: retreating to
the claim that ‘some episodes of scientific change exhibit TI, whereas others do
not’ (Mizrahi 2015a, 372). He rightly objects that such a claim would have no
explanatory or predictive value. However, my proposal is more robust: rather than
just exclude the anomalous cases, I have offered an independent characterization
of subtypes of revolution for which (TI) still holds.7 Hence (TI) is false as a claim
about revolutions in general, as Mizrahi rightly observes. But it is true of two
important subtypes: paraglorious and inglorious revolutions.8
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